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Economy

Rally around which flag?

: Investigation of the impact of sanctions on the rally around the flag effects using focus group discussion with North Korean defectors
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Title Rally around which flag?
Subtitle Investigation of the impact of sanctions on the rally around the flag effects using focus group discussion with North Korean defectors
Author Baran Han; Inbok Rhee; Chrysostomos Tabakis
Publisher KDI School of Public Policy and Management
Publication Date 2021 - 01
Material Type Report
Country North Korea Holding KDI School of Public Policy and Management
Language English License
Series Title Development Studies Series

Abstract

Despite focused and concerted efforts, why have sanctions against North Korea been ineffective in forcing Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear programs? On the surface, the sanctions against North Korea appear to have had all the elements for success. First, the sanctions received broad international support. Since the first United Nations Security Council resolution against North Korea in 2006, the international community has imposed sanctions to condemn its missile and nuclear tests. Second, the sanctions were of high intensity and broad scope. Initially, before 2016, the UN resolutions were defined narrowly around the missiles and nuclear programs. Throughout 2016 and 2017, however, after North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test on 6 January 2016 and launched a ballistic missile on 7 February 2016, the sanction expanded in scope to curb the financial capability of the regime by installing trade bans, restricting access to foreign financial institutions, and prohibiting the employment of North Korean workers abroad. Third, the US was even able to coerce China—previously considered to be the greatest loophole in the sanctions regime—to partake in the sanction drive against North Korea by imposing secondary sanctions in 2016. Fourth, the sanctions appear to have the intended negative impact on the North Korean economy: in 2017 and 2018, the North Korean economy experienced overall GNI growth rates of -3.5% and -4.1%, respectively, with sectors such as mining, which were direct targets of the sanctions, growing at rates of -11.0% and -17.8% (Bank of Korea Statistics n.d.). However, despite such a detrimental economic impact of the sanctions, the international community has yet to witness the North Korean state give up its nuclear arms.

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